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A Novel, Nonobvious Approach to
Curb Abusive Patent Litigants
Zachary H. Valentine*

INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: A young innovator sits in his
basement, meticulously coding podcasting software that, in his
opinion, will change the course of the industry. The innovator
tirelessly perfects the invention after work during the week,
eventually to the point where he wants to patent his new
invention and reap the rewards of his relentless labor. The young
innovator files with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, receives a patent, and opens up an online retailer to sell his
software. A few years later, after the software has seen new
updates and has graduated into retail stores and large ecommerce sites, the innovator receives a cease and desist letter
from a company that he has never heard of in essence stating that
his software infringes on a patent that covers a “system for
disseminating media content representing episodes in a serialized
sequence,” 1 and further threatens a patent infringement lawsuit if
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2016; B.S. in Biology, Salve Regina University, 2011. I would like to thank
my family for providing me with a continuing source of inspiration. I also
want to thank Scott DePasquale for his thoughtful conversations about
patent trolls, which ultimately resulted in my writing this Comment.
1. U.S. Patent No. 8,112,504, at [54] (filed Mar. 4, 2009) (issued Feb. 8,
2012). This patent was eventually invalidated after being challenged by the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, but not before plaintiff Personal Audio extorted famous podcaster
Adam Carolla into settling for an unknown sum, and also walked away with
a $1.3 million jury verdict against CBS. See Elec. Frontier Found. v. Pers.
Audio, No. IPR2014-00070, No. 41 at 29 (P.T.A.B. April 10, 2014); Joe Mullin,
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he refuses to shell out $100,000.
Unfortunately, this hypothetical innovator has encountered
one of the biggest problems currently stifling innovation. 2 Patent
trolls, or “patent assertion entities”—to be politically correct—are
patent holders that, in one way or another, obtain patents merely
to generate money through litigation rather than utilizing their
exclusive patent rights to create something new or practice the
field of art. 3 These patent trolls hunt small businesses and large
corporations alike by using egregious tactics to manipulate
inventors into abandoning their hard work and extort individuals
and organizations into paying licensing fees.4 Their modus
operandi is straightforward, although it differs depending on the
size of their prey. Patent trolls often hunt large corporations in
open court via infringement lawsuits.5 Although one would think
that the justice system would be a fair battleground, the diligent
patent trolls forum shop, seeking inconvenient courts with rocketdocket schedules, plaintiff-friendly verdicts, troll-friendly judges,
and jurors of limited education and technological sophistication.6
However, when the trolls approach smaller prey, they do so with
their hands under their trench coats—by sending threatening
letters to mom-and-pop businesses via certified mail.7 To date,
patent trolls have ultimately been able to weasel away with over a
half trillion dollars in wealth that could be going towards other
areas of the economy.8
Infamous “Podcasting Patent” Knocked Out, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 10, 2015,
6:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/infamous-podcastingpatent-knocked-out-in-patent-office-challenge/.
2. See WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR., PATENT TROLLS: PREDATORY LITIGATION
AND THE SMOTHERING OF INNOVATION 2 (2013).
3. Id. at 11.
4. Patricia S. Abril & Robert Plant, The Patent Holder’s Dilemma: Buy,
Sell, or Troll?, COMMC’NS. ACM., Jan. 2007, at 36, 43.
5. See, e.g., Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent
Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 2 (2005).
6. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 30–32.
7. See, e.g., Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the
Smartphone Wars: Triangulating the End Game, 119. PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 82–
83 (2014) (“PAEs have also targeted end users such as retailers using Wi-Fi
equipment instead of implementers who make the equipment. Earlier in
2011, one PAE, Innovatio, sent more than 8000 letters to hotels, coffee shops,
and restaurants who used technology by Cisco and Motorola, alleging patent
infringement.”).
8. WATKINS, supra note 2, at 16.
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This issue is all but unrecognized on a nationwide scale: in
the current legal field, “[p]atent trolling is at the top of legislative
and regulatory reform agendas at many levels.” 9 Congress, the
White House, state legislatures, and private entities have all tried
their hands at remedying the nuisance. 10 Additionally, the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has been scrutinizing patent
abusers to weed out questionable practices, 11 and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has made several
efforts 12 to increase patent quality. 13 While most efforts have
been lackluster in terms of curbing the abusive tactics of patent
assertion entities, the most effective bulwark thus far has been
the United States Supreme Court. 14 In 2014 alone, the Court
accepted seven patent-centric writs of certiorari—resulting in six

9. Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson Price II, Patent Trolling: Why Bio &
Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 773, 774 (2014).
10. See, e.g., STRONG Patents Act of 2015, S. 632, 114th Cong. (2015);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (2014); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION (2013), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf; Sarah Mitroff, Mark Cuban’s
‘Chair to Eliminate Stupid Patents’ Just Got Filled, WIRED (Dec. 20, 2012,
6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2012/12/eff-patent-donation/.
See also
Richard Mannella & Julie A. Hopkins, Patrolling the Patent Trolls: Ongoing
Developments in US IP Law, ACC DOCKET, Dec. 2014, at 78, 80, available at
http://us.practicallaw.com/4-590-9225 (follow “Click to download PDF”
hyperlink).
11. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (Mar. 2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-market
place-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/
110307patentreport.pdf; see also 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2006) (empowering the
FTC to conduct sweeping economic studies of business practices, including
patent assertion practices).
12. See, e.g., Request for Comments on Enhancing Patent Quality, 80
Fed. Reg. 6475, 6477 (proposed Feb. 5, 2015) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.
1).
13. See Feldman & Price, supra note 9, at 774–75.
14. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014)
(holding that process patents directed at an abstract idea ineligible subject
matter unless the process amounts to substantially more than the abstract
idea; applying an abstract idea with a form of technology does not meet this
standard); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007)
(holding that a licensee need not breach a licensing agreement in a
declaratory judgment for non-validity); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547
U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (requiring patent holders seeking permanent injunctive
relief to meet the traditional four-factor equitability test).
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unanimous opinions 15 and one 7-2 decision 16—that can be read as
a strategic effort to both close the door on patent trolls and
discourage unmeritorious litigation.17 However, the results will
be unsurprisingly disappointing because clever trolls can
inherently move more quickly than the Court and will actually be
able to take advantage of some of these decisions moving
forward.18 While the Court is mostly setting up downstream
barricades (i.e., trying to deter abusive patent holders from
bringing unmeritorious claims), the lacerations in the patent
system left as a result of the trolls cannot be remedied without
extensive upstream blockades (i.e. not granting patent trolls
patents to abuse in the first place). In this sense, areas ripe for
mending are located within the patentability inquiry: the novelty
and nonobviousness requirements.
This Comment begins with Part I, which introduces the
problem of patent trolls and their history. Part II analyzes how
the Court has been addressing the issue of patent trolling, as well
as its overall (in)effectiveness. In Part III, I will predict some
problems that may arise due to the Court’s recent efforts and will
argue that, despite the push, patent trolls will respond by
changing their methods to target the patentability analysis out of
court. Finally, Part IV will argue that, because of this predicted
shift in patent troll behavior, narrowing the novelty and
nonobviousness analyses through the judiciary will be the most
effective way to mend the patent system without leaving good
faith innovators handicapped. By narrowing these patentability
inquiries, the Court will not only fend off abusive patent litigation,
but will also discourage trolls from purchasing dated patent rights
altogether, a common troll motif. 19 This approach is inherently
the next logical step in light of recent decisions, and the results
15. Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347; Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2120 (2014); Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2111 (2014); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1749 (2014); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1744 (2014); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct.
843 (2014).
16. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
17. See Mannella & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 82, 84.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 13; Chan & Fawcett, supra note 5, at
2–4.
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will be analogous to the aftermath of the Court’s recent decision in
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, which addressed patent
eligibility for processes directed toward an abstract idea.20 While
tinkering with the patentability analysis will ultimately lead to
fewer available patents, even for even good faith innovators, it will
reduce the number of ambiguous patents for trolls to acquire,
thereby decreasing litigation arising from vexatious plaintiffs
while simultaneously discouraging threats behind closed doors.
By adhering to this method, the Court will also be able to fulfill
the ultimate constitutional goal of the patent system: promoting
useful arts by only rewarding truly innovative creators the powers
of exclusivity. 21
I. TROLLING FOR DOLLARS
Patent trolls currently present a substantial threat to the
United States economy. 22 Of all the colloquialisms, they are the
legal equivalent of the bad apple that spoils the whole bunch.
These individuals and entities confidently feed off the current
system because, realistically, when the cost to defend a suit
against a troll can range in the tens-to-hundreds-of-millions, 23 it
is more economical for a defendant to give into their shakedown
than to pay the costs associated with civil discovery. 24
20. See 134 S. Ct. at 2352. See also Donald Zuhn, USPTO Holds Forum
on Interim Guidance—Part III, PAT. DOCS (Feb. 19, 2015 11:59 PM),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2015/02/uspto-holds-forum-on-interim-guidancepart-iii.html (“[I]n the span of ten months, the allowance rate for business
method art units had dipped from 24% in January to 5% in July to 3% in
October.”).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries”).
22. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 16–17.
23. See, e.g., Philip Elmer-DeWitt, How Apple Lost $533 million to an
8th-grade dropout patent troll, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 2015, 12:22 PM),
http://fortune.com/2015/02/27/how-apple-lost-533-million-to-an-8th-gradedropout-patent-troll/ ($533 million jury verdict against Apple Inc. awarded to
patent troll); Joe Mullin, Symantec Must Pay $17 Million to World’s Biggest
TECHNICA
(Feb.
9,
2015,
12:09
PM),
Patent
Troll,
ARS
http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/02/symantec-must-pay-17million-to-worlds-biggest-patent-troll/ ($17 million verdict against Symantec
Corp. awarded to patent troll).
24. See John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 2111, 2129 (2007); see also Anna Mayergoyz, Comment, Lessons from
Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 241, 242–43
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Additionally, by skirting the production of goods in commerce,
abusive patent holders entirely obviate the Constitution’s explicit
goals by hindering and discouraging innovation. 25 By now it
should be patently evident that these “patent trolls” are on
Santa’s naughty list, but how did they get there in the first place?
Although patent trolls may make one think of the old
“Norwegian fairy tale of Three Billy Goats Gruff,” which featured
“a troll living under [a] bridge, attacking any person or thing who
dare[d] to cross,” in reality, patent trolls are often inanimate,
incorporated entities. 26 The “troll” denomination was coined by
Intel Corporation’s then-assistant general counsel Peter Detkin to
describe “somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent
that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing
and in most cases never practiced.” 27 More eloquently delineated
as “nonpracticing entities” (“NPEs”), “patent assertion entities”
(“PAEs”), or “patent monetizers,” these patent holders
characteristically own patent rights but only use them to “create”
infringement litigation. 28 While these delineated categories all
fall under the umbrella of the term “patent troll,” and are often
used synonymously, subtle differences exist between NPEs and
PAEs. 29
Described simply, NPEs are “entit[ies] that own[] patents, but
do[] not manufacture or market a product.” 30 Common examples
that fall under this wide net include: (1) start-up companies that
have not yet perfected their manufacturing processes; (2)
(2009).
25. Cf. Leslie T. Grab, Note, Equitable Concerns of eBay v.
MercExchange: Did the Supreme Court Successfully Balance Patent
Protection Against Patent Trolls?, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 81, 84 (2006).
26. WATKINS, supra note 2, at 11; see Chan & Fawcett, supra note 5, at
1–3.
27. Mayergoyz, supra note 24, at 245 (quoting Brenda Sandburg,
Trolling for Dollars, RECORDER, Jul. 30, 2001, at 1); see also Peter N. Detkin,
Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 636,
636 & n.3 (2007).
28. WATKINS, supra note 2, at 11. See, e.g., Chan & Fawcett, supra note
5, at 1; Feldman & Price, supra note 9, at 773.
29. For the sake of this Comment, the “patent monetizer” nomenclature
is a mere tautology of the “PAE” nomenclature. PAEs inherently are patent
monetizers because they seek to capitalize on the efforts of inventors by
purchasing patents and using them as a weapon in commerce. See Feldman
& Price, supra note 9, at 773–75.
30. Mannella & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 77.
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companies that once sold a product but ceased to continue; and,
most controversially in terms of patent reform, (3) universities
and research institutions (including their respective technology
transfer offices). 31
In the same vein, PAEs also do not
manufacture anything, but what makes them particularly
nefarious is their strategy to acquire extensive patent portfolios
for the sole purpose of suing other market players for patent
infringement.32 In this sense, PAEs can be considered more
malicious than NPEs because they never have, are not currently,
and most likely never will, produce anything other than adversity,
and can be considered less trustworthy because of their tactics in
obtaining and enforcing their patents.33 While these tactics are
frankly genius, they have come to reek of moral turpitude when
viewed in the historical context of patent trolling.
A. The Patent Troll Adaptive-Evolution
In a sense patent trolling is all but old news: people have been
milking the patent system since this nation’s founding. 34 While
the concept of exploiting patents might be old, as time has
progressed, trolls’ strategies have grown in complexity to keep up
with the advancing technologies that they exploit. 35 Throughout
this evolution, however, there has been a common theme: obtain
and hold a patent for a soon-to-be-obsolete technology that is
broad enough to cover whatever technology inevitably takes its
place. 36
Patents are engrained in the Constitution as a method for
Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive right to their . . .
Discoveries.” 37 The essential goal—promoting the evolution of
31. See id.; see also Brian Pomper, In Considering Patent Law Changes,
Don’t Forget Impact on Universities, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 15, 2015),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/02/15/patent-law-changes-impact-onuniversities/.
32. Mannella & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 77.
33. See id.
34. See generally JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT
TROLLS: A POPULIST VISION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2008).
35. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 1–5.
36. See id. at 13.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8. Today, the term “useful Arts” is
considered to encompass the “technological arts.” See In re Musgrave, 431
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technology—was thought by many of the Founders to be served
most effectively by granting creators monopolies for a limited
amount of time.38 Thomas Jefferson, who is at the forefront of
patent trolling history, thought quite the opposite, 39 and it was
likely he who encountered the first patent troll.40 In these early
days, although “[n]o one . . . was acting as a patent troll[] under
[its] modern definition[,] . . . [t]here were, however, a growing
number of inventors who were beginning to integrate licensing of
rights to use patents into a deliberate commercial strategy.” 41
These early inventors would, in addition to manufacturing their
own patented goods, license the rights to do so to other
manufacturers in return for a royalty on the sales. 42 Although,
this is a common method of doing business for both trolls and nontrolls, today this notion offended Jefferson, who believed that such
a practice was “overreaching and [a] misuse of patent rights” that
would ultimately “thwart the development of new applications and
enhancements for existing devices and processes.” 43 Although the
Court disagreed with him when the issue arose in litigation,44
Jefferson is notably one of the first individuals to recognize that
patent rights, if not utilized properly, could impede the progress of
technology.45
Around the same time, Eli Whitney, a name every elementary
school student in the United States recognizes as the famous
inventor of the cotton gin, proved to be the originator (albeit not
F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
38. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 4.
39. See Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug.
13, 1813), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 600–01 (Phillip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/
founders/print_documents/v1ch16s25.html (“It has been pretended by some,
(and in England especially,) that inventors have a natural and exclusive right
to their inventions . . . . Inventions cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.
Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this
may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society,
without claim or complaint from anybody.”).
40. See MATSUURA, supra note 34, at 101–02.
41. Id. at 101.
42. See id. at 101–02.
43. Id. at 102, 106.
44. See Evans v. Jordan & Morehead, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199, 202
(1815).
45. See MATSUURA, supra note 34, at 106.
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widely recognized by the legal community) of patent trolling
strategies and acted as an NPE by today’s standards. 46 After
successfully obtaining a patent for the cotton gin, 47 Whitney’s
manufacturing company went out of business and discontinued
production three short years later. 48 Thereafter, to monetize his
patent, Whitney resorted to suing plantation farmers for patent
infringement.49 Similarly, George Selden, a patent attorney who
is commonly recognized as the first patent troll, began operating
as a PAE under the modern definition as early as 1895.50 Selden
“obtained a patent for automobile engine technology[,]” and
“[t]hrough a holding company, he threatened to sue the
automotive industry for patent infringement to obtain licensing
fees.” 51 Today, patent trolls retain this fundamental practice.
To be successful, however, trolls need to obtain patents. To
meet the growing demand, “patent sharks” began brokering
patent ownership rights to trigger-happy litigants early in patent
troll history. 52 As the technological renaissance progressed, “the
market for patent trading and patent assertion has expanded
dramatically,” especially as newer, more efficient products
outcompeted once-popular technologies. 53 Nowadays, some patent
trolls target despondent companies and either offer to purchase
their patent, or more nefariously lurk around “bankruptcy
auctions where patents of failed technology companies are offered
for sale . . . . [This] ha[s] allowed many trolls to accumulate
massive portfolios.” 54

46. See Mannella & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 78.
47. U.S. Patent No. 9,957 (issued Mar. 14, 1794), available at
http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/cotton-gin-patent/ (last visited
Feb. 14, 2015). The actual patent number is not actually known, but rather
is a rough estimate. See Julian Trubin, Eli Whitney, The Invention of the
Cotton Gin, JULIAN TRUBIN (June 2013), http://www.juliantrubin.com/
bigten/whitneycottongin.html.
48. See MITCHELL WILSON, AMERICAN SCIENCE AND INVENTION: A
PICTORIAL HISTORY 80 (1954).
49. See id.
50. See Mannella & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 78.
51. Id.
52. See Feldman & Price, supra note 9, at 778.
53. Id.; see also WATKINS, supra note 2, at 13.
54. WATKINS, supra note 2, at 13.
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B. The Patent Troll Issue is Socially and Monetarily Expensive
Trolls famously target software patents, business method
patents, and patents for outdated technologies because the
turnaround is inherently guaranteed: Business method patents
are plentiful and large corporations continue to update their
technologies,
rendering
the
last
generation
moot.55
Unsurprisingly, the very same corporations that are in the
business of creating the usurping products are common targets for
patent trolls.56 To battle these corporate behemoths, trolls have
evolved their simple “wait and sue” strategy into one that exploits
the judiciary and manipulates the public: forum shopping.57
However, the forum shopping tactic utilized by trolls is not
necessarily based in conflicts of law, as it is generally. Trolls
forum shop in the same way you or I would shop for groceries—in
the same places every time.58 And, in the same way our
supermarkets encourage us to return, these fora continue to
graciously welcome patent troll lawsuits. 59
Generally, a troll’s primary objective is to file suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, “the
American mecca of patent litigation.” 60 In return, the Eastern
District of Texas continuously hosts patent-holding plaintiffs with
an open embrace.61 Recent statistics show that the Eastern
District of Texas leads the nation in the number of patent suits
filed, followed closely by the District of Delaware.62 Known trolls
55. See Mannella & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 78; Gene Quinn, Business
Methods by the Numbers: A Look Inside PTO Class 705, IPWATCHDOG (Jan.
22, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/01/22/business-methods-by-thenumbers-a-look-inside-pto-class-705/.
56. See, e.g., Brian Howard, Lex Machina Releases First Annual Patent
Litigation Year in Review, LEX MACHINA (May 13, 2014), https://lexmachina.
com/patent-litigation-review/ (listing Apple, Amazon, AT&T, and others as
the companies facing the highest number of new patent infringement
lawsuits in 2014).
57. See David G. Barker, Comment, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent
Usage with an Open Post-Grant Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, ¶ 7
(2005), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1129&context=dltr.
58. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 56.
59. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 31–32.
60. Id. at 1.
61. See id. at 31–32.
62. See Howard, supra note 56. Lex Machina, a firm that analyzes
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hold at least three of the top ten spots for the amount of patents
asserted in court by plaintiffs, and, unsurprisingly, the most
common defendants in these suits are large technology
companies—Apple, Amazon, and AT&T. 63 While the Delaware
and Eastern Texas district courts are roughly tied for the amount
of patents cases that actually go to trial, plaintiffs filing in the
Eastern District of Texas have an astoundingly high victory rate
in comparison, estimated in past years as high as 78%.64 The
Eastern District of Texas is also notorious for its rocket-docket
schedule crammed with patent infringement cases, as well as its
propensity for lay-jury trials in these oftentimes hyper-technical
suits. 65 Patent trolls literally set up shop within the Eastern
District’s jurisdiction to purposefully avail themselves to these
patent litigation trends and other patent-relevant variables, speculates that
patent-plaintiffs may consider the District of Delaware “as an increasingly
friendly venue” due to the fact that a hefty portion of companies are
headquartered in the state. Id.
63. Id. Some critics believe that the percentage of patent-troll plaintiffs
is closer to sixty percent:
Of the ten plaintiffs filing the most lawsuits, all are trolls. The most
litigious troll last year was ArrivalStar, a company that Ars
[Technica] first reported on in 2012 when the company started suing
public transit agencies. ArrivalStar, run by Vancouver resident
Martin Jones, agreed to back away from that strategy after a US
transit group lawyered up, but it continues to sue a vast array of
private companies using different forms of vehicle-tracking
technology.
Looking at the ten most frequently asserted patents, seven of them
are from the ArrivalStar family of patents describing vehicletracking technology. Other patents on the most-asserted list include
ones that originated at AT&T, Xerox, and Stanford University but
are now in the hands of various trolls.
Joe Mullin, The Year in Patent Litigation: More Trolling, More Texas, ARS
TECHNICA (May 14, 2014, 1:27 PM) [hereinafter 2014 in Patent Litigation],
http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/the-year-in-patent-litigationmore-trolling-more-texas/.
64. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 29 (citing Julie Blackman, Ellen
Brickman & Corinne Brenner, East Texas Jurors and Patent Litigation, JURY
EXPERT (March 1, 2010), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/wp-content/uploads/
BlackmanetalTJEMarch2010.pdf); 2014 in Patent Litigation, supra note 63.
65. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 29–31. Some commentators suggest
that the issue of allowing lay juries to hear patent cases is another avenue to
reform patent law to curb patent trolling. See, e.g., id. at 52–53; Rob Tiller,
Another Idea for Addressing Patent Trolling: Eliminate Jury Trials,
OPENSOURCE.COM (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.opensource.com/law/15/2/
patent-reform-eliminate-jury-trials.
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benefits and manipulate the public (i.e., potential jurors) along the
way by “masquerade[ing] as nonprofit foundations and community
do-gooders.” 66 Moreover, of all the patent cases filed in the
Eastern District of Texas, Judge Rodney Gilstrap sees more than
triple the amount as any other judge in the district. 67
Trolls are able to lure defendants to their favorite forum by
exploiting federal circuit law governing specific jurisdiction.68 In
patent infringement suits brought by troll-plaintiffs against large
companies that deliberately market their products to consumers
nationwide, “the jurisdictional inquiry is relatively easily
discerned from the nature and extent of the commercialization of
the accused products or services by the [company] in the forum”
because “the claim both ‘arises out of’ and ‘relates to’ the
[company’s] alleged manufacturing, using, or selling of the
claimed invention.” 69 Therefore, many infringement defendants
that fall target to trolls will be subject to the specific jurisdiction of
the Eastern District of Texas.
On the other side of the coin, large companies cannot lure
trolls away from their Eastern Texas forum. If a large company
were to bring an action for declaratory judgment in response to an
infringement claim “to clear the air of infringement charges,” its
cause of action would “neither directly arise[] out of nor relate[] to
the making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing of
arguably infringing products in the forum, but instead [would]
arise[] out of or relate[] to the activities of the [troll] in enforcing
66. WATKINS, supra note 2, at 17; see also id. at 30–32.
67. See 2014 in Patent Litigation, supra note 63, at fig. 13.
68. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 23–24. The jurisdictional analysis in
infringement cases is familiar; courts look to whether the claim arises out of
activities that the defendant (e.g., a large technology company) has directed
towards the forum. See Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc.,
444 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). If the court answers in the affirmative,
the court will then examine whether the jurisdictional assertion would be fair
and reasonable for the defendant. Id. This places the burden on the
defendant to ‘“present a compelling case that the presence of some other
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable’ under the five-factor
test articulated in by the Supreme Court in Burger King [Corp. v.
Rudzewicz].” Id. (quoting 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985)); see also World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (setting out a fivefactor test for analyzing specific jurisdiction inquiries).
69. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
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the patent or patents in suit.” 70 Thus, the jurisdictional inquiry
shifts from one focusing on activities arising from the forum to
activities that are related to the forum, which, for a large company
headquartered in areas other than the Eastern District of Texas,
is merely the receipt of a letter marked with a Marshall, Texas
return address that alleged infringement—an activity that falls
short of satisfying the specific jurisdiction analysis. 71
Therefore, through this jurisdictional misbalance in favor of
troll-plaintiffs, the Eastern District of Texas acts as a black hole
vacuuming up large prey. When the inquiry shifts to the
defendant, however, they can rarely assert that their forum is
proper.72 This inherently incentivizes trolls to stay hunkered
down in the Eastern District of Texas and encourages further
abuse of the system. This jurisdictional battle for the Eastern
District of Texas is also a lose-lose scenario: (1) the troll’s target
will not have their forum preference, and (2) defendants will likely
lose the ultimate lawsuit due to troll-sympathetic juries.
Moreover, the average infringement case can cost up to $4 million
just to defend. 73
Thus, it is painfully obvious that many
companies settle with trolls in fear of a loss that could be in the
eight-figure range.74
From an overhead perspective, the continuous exploitation of
the judicial system is only a prerequisite to the worst evil
perpetrated by patent trolls—the hindering of research and
development (“R&D”).75 Unfortunately, settlements are not the
70. Id. (quoting Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148
F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
71. See, e.g., id. at 1333.
72. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 24.
73. See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASSOC., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY
35 (2013), available at http://library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/
1109295819134-177/AIPLA+2013+Survey_Press_Summary+pages.pdf.
74. See, e.g., Andrew Chung, U.S. Jury Says Motorola Infringed One
Intellectual Ventures Patent, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2015, 6:20 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2015/03/25/us-usa-motorola-patent-verdictidUSKBN0ML2NS20150325; see also Michael Blanding, Bringing Patent
Trolls into the Light, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2014, 11:10 AM), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2014/08/20/bringing-patent-trolls-into-thelight/.
75. See COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON.,
Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., A PATENT
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 95 (2004) [hereinafter A PATENT SYSTEM]; see
also Paul M. Mersino, Note, Patents, Trolls, and Personal Property: Will eBay
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only source of monetary harm to companies; in fact, it has been
argued that the troll problem does not necessarily stem from
abusive litigation tactics. 76 Patent trolls are the estimated cause
of $29 billion leached from defendant-companies per annum “in
direct out-of pocket costs,” and, “in aggregate, patent litigation
destroys over $60 billion in firm wealth each year.” 77 Shockingly,
this number may actually be a conservative estimate because it
only includes “legal fees going to lawyers, and the licensing fees
paid in tribute to make the trolls go away,” and, moreover, “[t]he
findings come from a relatively small sample of 83 companies,
both small and large.” 78 As R&D is the precursor to innovation,
the leaching of budgetary funds from R&D directly undercuts the
driving purpose of the patent system. For large technology firms,
the costs of defending patent troll suits divert huge R&D
expenditures; in fact, “[i]n 2011, Apple and Google spent more
money on patent litigation and defensive patent acquisitions than
on research and development.” 79 In contrast, the cost to an
Auction Away a Patent Holder’s Right to Exclude?, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 307,
316 (2007).
76. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 3 (2008). However, the
numbers stated should be received with caution, as some economists disagree
as to whether they accurately reflect an unbiased examination of the patent
trolling problem. Compare James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct
Costs From NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 412 (2014) (“Given the
explosion of NPE patent litigation, it is difficult to pin down precisely the
direct costs to defendants, but we believe that the $29 billion annual
figure . . . is a plausible estimate; the true number could be higher or lower.”),
with David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 455 (2014) (“Bessen
and Meurer’s study provides some new data for discussion. However,
limitations in the data suggest to us that their findings should be viewed
skeptically, as an outer boundary of the costs of NPE litigation, and one that
is likely to be substantially overstated.”).
See also Joff Wild, Blog,
Deconstructing Bessen and Meurer – Paper Raises Big Questions over Their
NPE Claims, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Jul. 27, 2012), http://www.iam-media.com
/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=454c1adc-52c3-4c2d-8981-e4716361f219.
77. James Bessen, The Evidence Is in: Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation,
HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2014, available at https://www.hbr.org/2014/07/theevidence-is-in-patent-trolls-do-hurt-innovation.
78. Joe Mullin, New Study, Same Authors: Patent Trolls Cost Economy
$29 Billion Yearly, ARS TECHNICA (July 3, 2012, 10:11 AM), http://www.ars
technica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/new-study-same-authors-patent-trolls-costeconomy-29-billion-yearly/ [hereinafter New Study].
79. Sam Gustin, Viewpoint: Obama’s ‘Patent Troll’ Reform: Why
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unsuccessful patent troll is minimal because patent trolls’
attorneys usually work on a contingency fee basis. 80 Additionally,
trolls do not have to divert R&D funds to their litigation budget
because they do not make any products. 81 Thus, the common
solution put forth in reform efforts usually involves fee shifting.82
However, such “downstream” solutions are not likely to fix the
problem of patent trolling. 83
II. RECENT REFORM EFFORTS ARE INSUFFICIENT

As discussed, patent trolling is stifling American innovation
by sucking money directly from R&D budgets. In this light, it is
not surprising that the common reform efforts have targeted
remedies in order to balance out budgetary misbalances. Through
the patent-troll-lawsuit-continuum, remedies can be considered
“downstream” because a settlement or judgment is typically the
end of the line for many cases. “Upstream” activities, on the other
hand, normally occur before litigation is even conceived; for
example, the application and prosecution of the patent. These
upstream areas typically do not involve the patent troll because,
as discussed, patent trolls buy patent rights much later down the
road—after the patent has already been approved by the USPTO,
and perhaps even practiced for a period of time thereafter. 84 The
difficulties in patent reform can be summed up succinctly as
follows. How do we curb patent troll activities (i.e., abusive
litigation and enveloped threats) without foreclosing the patent
system to inventors who do not wish to abuse it (i.e., people who
actually make something useful for society)? Furthermore, can we
Everyone Should Care, TIME (June 8, 2013), http://www.business.time.com/
2013/06/08/viewpoint-obamas-patent-troll-reform-why-everyone-should-care/.
80. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 15–16 (stating that contingency fees
commonly range as high as 45%).
81. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 15.
82. See, e.g., Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (giving district courts more discretion in awarding
attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health
Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014) (requiring the Federal Circuit to be
more deferential to district courts in awarding attorney’s fees under 35
U.S.C. § 285); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013).
83. See Gene Quinn, Fee-shifting Won’t Do Anything to Stop Patent
Trolls, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/03/03/
fee-shifting-wont-do-anything-to-stop-patent-trolls/ [hereinafter Fee-Shifting].
84. See Chan & Fawcett, supra note 5, at 2.
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A. Setting up Downstream
Recent reforms that have focused on curbing patent trolls
once litigation has already commenced have been met with mixed
reviews. 85 Rather than focusing on remedies and their associated
procedural aspects, it may be better to focus on the upstream
activities before the patent is granted. By preventing the patent
from being eligible or patentable in the first place, a patent troll
cannot obtain broadly worded or ambiguous patents to use as
weapons. While this would foreclose the patent system for those
who do not wish to abuse their patent rights to some extent, it
would reinforce the constitutional goal of promoting innovation by
disarming trolls and favoring only strong patents.
The judiciary has been toiling with this problem for centuries.
Perhaps the most powerful recognition was that of Justice Bradley
over 130 years ago in Atlantic Works v. Brady. 86 The patent at
issue covered a dredging boat that utilized a pump, a mud-fan,
and a series of tanks that, to keep the vessel level, would fill with
water based on the depth below. 87 This process was reversible by
the pump, which could remove water from the watertight
compartments
depending
on
the
mud-flap’s
depth
measurements. 88 The plaintiff-owner of the patent filed an
infringement suit against Atlantic Works, a builder of boats that
functioned in approximately the same manner but used a different
mode of operation. 89 The defendant challenged the patent’s
validity on the grounds of invention 90 and novelty, arguing that
85. See, e.g., Fee-Shifting, supra note 83.
86. 107 U.S. 192 (1883).
87. Id. at 193–94.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 194–99.
90. “Invention,” or lack thereof, is an outdated doctrine that is hardly
applied by the courts when examining validity, mainly due to the subsequent
amendments to the Patent Act since Atlantic Works, and the difficulty in
maintaining such a standard; as the Supreme Court stated in 1841:
The truth is, the word cannot be defined in such manner as to afford
any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device
involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not. In a given case
we may be able to say that there is present invention of a very high
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“the principle of said dredge-boat[] had been substantially known
and publically used before.” 91 Justice Bradley agreed with the
defendant, opining that patents were not designed to grant a
monopoly for “every slight advance made.” 92
What do dredging boats have to do with modern-day patent
trolls suing large corporations? First, they can both be, at least
hypothetically, found under bridges.
Second, and more
importantly, they both have a connection to the struggles involved
with reforming patent law. In denying the validity of the patent,
Justice Bradley succinctly added:
The design of the patent laws is to reward those who
make some substantial discovery or invention, which
adds to our knowledge and makes a step in advance in
the useful arts. Such inventors are worthy of all favor. It
was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for
every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea,
which would naturally and spontaneously occur to any
skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of
manufactures.
Such an indiscriminate creation of
exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to
stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative
schemers who make it their business to watch the
advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in
the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to
lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without
contributing anything to the real advancement of the
arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with
fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown
liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious accountings for
order. In another we can see that there is lacking that impalpable
something which distinguishes invention from simple mechanical
skill. Courts, adopting fixed principles as a guide, have by a process
of exclusion determined that certain variations in old devices do or
do not involve invention, but whether the variation relied upon in a
particular case is anything more than ordinary mechanical skill is a
question which cannot be answered by applying the test of any
general definition.
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891). The Patent Act currently
defines “invention” as an “invention or discovery.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2015).
91. Atl. Works, 107 U.S. at 194.
92. Id. at 200.
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profits made in good faith. 93
Thus, the century-old patent reform problem is a doubleedged sword: incentivizing innovation by granting limited
monopolies also allows litigants to abuse such monopolies without
contributing to society. While the system is willing to grant
patents to those who increase public knowledge, the current
structure’s overinclusive nature allows trolls to hold onto
unpracticed patents and use their exclusive rights to invidiously
threaten legitimate businesses—the costs of which ultimately fall
onto the consumer. 94
Because patent trolls mainly cause damage to innovation by
abusing their patent rights in court, reform efforts try to chip
away at their litigation practices. This may be the reason why
recent reforms have addressed the troll problem by discouraging
litigation; for example, the Court just recently issued unanimous
decisions aimed towards deterring frivolous patent litigation in
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness 95 and Highmark
Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc. 96 The Court in
both cases focused on the Patent Act’s attorney’s fee provision,
which allows a district court “in exceptional cases [to] award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 97 Since 2005,
the Federal Circuit had only awarded attorney’s fees when a party
could show “material inappropriate conduct related to the matter
in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable
conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation,
vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates
93.
94.

Id.
See WATKINS, supra note 2 at 15–19; FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW
AND POLICY, ch. 3, at 40–41 (2003) [hereinafter TO PROMOTE INNOVATION],
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovationproper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf.
95. 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755–57 (2014) (reasoning that the Federal Circuit’s
rigid test for determining whether an “exceptional” case exists in awarding
attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 impermissibly interferes with a district
court’s discretion; holding that the standard for an “exceptional” case is one
that sticks out from others due to its frivolous nature).
96. 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2014) (holding that a district court’s decision
to award attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 must be reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard).
97. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012); see also Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757;
Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749.
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Fed.R.Civ.P.11, or like infractions” as “established by clear and
convincing evidence.” 98 The Court rejected this “unduly rigid”
formulation, and found that the Federal Circuit’s abandonment of
a “holistic, equitable approach” ten years prior was “inconsistent
with the text” of the attorney’s fee statute. 99 Preferring the
ordinary meaning of the word “exceptional,” the Court held in
Octane that awarding attorney’s fees is within the district court’s
discretion—in other words, when a court reviews the totality of
the circumstances and determines that the case “simply . . . stands
out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a
party’s litigating position” or when the case was litigated in an
“unreasonable manner.”100 Accordingly, because the district court
has discretion in this determination, the Court further held in
Highmark that such a finding is only reviewable under an abuse
of discretion standard.101
The Court has tried to set up other downstream barriers by
easing the ability for an accused infringer to bring an action for
declaratory judgment. In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the
Court held that a party in an infringement case could still bring
an action for declaratory judgment to challenge the patent’s
validity regardless of whether that party was paying royalties to
the other party in accordance with a licensing agreement. 102 The
Court’s decision was thought to “diminish trolls’ abilit[ies] to use
legal threats as a means of extracting advantageous licensing
agreements” because trolls had commonly argued that licensees
would not pay a licensor fees for an invalid patent. 103 Although
the Court rejected this reasoning, the trolls were still able to get
around the MedImmune holding by altering their licensing
agreements in a manner that shields themselves against

98. Brooks Furniture Mfg. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381–
82 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
99. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1754–55; Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1748; see also
35 U.S.C. § 285.
100. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756.
101. Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012)
(empowering the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over patent
cases).
102. 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007).
103. Mayergoyz, supra note 24, at 255; see MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 123–
25.
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declaratory judgments. 104 The Court revisited this problem in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC. 105 Adding
further firepower to the anti-troll arsenal, the Court held that in
scenarios where a defendant-licensee raises a declaratory
judgment for noninfringement in response to a plaintiff-licensor’s
infringement charge, the burden does not shift to the licensee, but
remains on the plaintiff. 106 Thus, MedImmune provides a layer of
protection for infringement defendants by allowing them to pay
royalties on a patent without forfeiting their ability to challenge
the patent’s validity and Medtronic provides a “straightforward,
undiverted analysis of the burden of proof question” 107 in
responsive noninfringement declaratory judgment actions. In
combination, these two decisions facilitate a defendant’s ability to
challenge a patent in response to an infringement suit.
In the same year as MedImmune, a unanimous Court in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. also came to the aid of infringement
defendants by making it more difficult for trolls to get injunctive
relief. 108 Rather than automatically enjoining a defendant after a
finding of infringement, as the Federal Circuit had commonly
done, 109 the Court instead found that injunctions may be granted
only after weighing the traditional equitable factors.110 While
104. See Jennifer L. Collins & Michael A. Cicero, The Impact of
MedImmune Upon Both Licensing and Litigation, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 748, 750–56 (2007) (offering alternative licensing agreements to
avoid declaratory judgments).
105. 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014).
106. Id. at 846.
107. Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Unimpressed with Federal
Circuit’s Mastery of Federal Procedure Curriculum, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 23,
2014, 12:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/01/opinion-analysis-justices
-unimpressed-with-federal-circuits-mastery-of-federal-procedure-curriculum/.
108. See 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006).
109. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d
1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (“It is the general rule that an injunction will
issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound reason for
denying it.”).
110. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (“According to well-established principles of
equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor
test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)
that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
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this certainly would have been an impediment to trolls, the Court
cut the blow by further holding that the denial of an injunction
cannot be based on whether or not the plaintiff actually practiced
the invention, as “traditional equitable principles do not permit
such broad classifications.” 111 The majority rejected the argument
that an entity’s “lack of commercial activity in practicing [its]
patents” would nullify any inference of irreparable harm. 112
The inherent difficulties in patent reform were also
illustrated through the interplay between the eBay majority
opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. The majority fell
victim to a common argument in support of patent trolls:113
[S]ome patent holders, such as university researchers or
self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to license
their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the
financing necessary to bring their works to market
themselves. Such patent holders may be able to satisfy
the traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for
categorically denying them the opportunity to do so. 114
Recognizing the distinction between NPEs and PAEs, Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence highlighted that the Court’s holding,
aimed at more palatable NPEs, could aid trolling activities. 115
Notably, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was also the first official
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”).
111. Id. at 393.
112. Id. (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695,
712 (E.D. Va. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. See, e.g., Raymond P. Niro & Paul K. Vickrey, The Patent Troll Myth,
7 SEDONA CONF. J. 153, 156 (2006); see also WATKINS, supra note 2, at 16
(“Supporters of NPEs [argue] that trolls actually benefit the system because
they stand up to large companies that, in the past, could infringe patents
without repercussions. An individual inventor or small company, they assert,
could not afford to take an infringer to court. Trolls fight for the rights of the
little guy. By purchasing the patent, the argument continues, trolls infuse
capital into small business that can in turn focus on more R&D. [Trolls]
assume the risk of enforcing patents, and inventors can focus on
inventing. . . . NPE advocates [also] point out that trolls are legitimate
holders of a piece of property that are entitled under the law to protect their
property rights. Just as heirs who had no role in creating or building up
grandfather’s company have a right to manage or sell the company they
inherited, so do trolls have a right to license and enforce patents they have
acquired.” (citations omitted)).
114. eBay, 347 U.S. at 393.
115. See id. at 395–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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condemnation of troll activities from a sitting member of the
Court:
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not
as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead,
primarily for obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an
injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising
from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to
charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy
licenses to practice the patent. When the patented
invention is but a small component of the product the
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction
is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations,
legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for
the infringement and an injunction may not serve the
public interest. . . . The potential vagueness and suspect
validity of some of these patents may affect the calculus
under the four-factor test. 116
Justice Kennedy’s skepticism has yet to lose its basis in
reality. 117 However, the eBay case has been marginally successful
in curbing patent troll activities because it removed the
permanent injunction remedy from the trolls’ arsenal. 118
The Court has also sought to make life harder for patent trolls
in the area of inducing infringement. In Limelight Networks, Inc.
v. Akamai Technologies, Inc. A unanimous Court held that
defendants cannot be liable for inducing infringement when there

116. Id. at 396–97 (citations omitted). Since this case, the Court has
continued to address the issue of patent trolling directly. See Commil USA,
LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930–31 (2015). While Commil did
end up “increas[ing] the in terrorem power of patent trolls,” at least it is now
apparent that the Court is unified in recognizing patent trolls as a legitimate
issue. Id. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see id. at 1930–31 (majority
opinion). Curiously, before Justice Scalia’s dissent in Commil, the Court had
never used the term “patent troll” in an opinion. See Jeff John Roberts,
Supreme Court Says “Patent Troll” for First Time in Cisco ruling, FORTUNE
(May 26, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.fortune.com/2015/05/26/scotus-ciscopatent-trolls/.
117. See, e.g., Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1930–31 (majority opinion); id. at
1932 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
118. See, e.g., Lim, supra note 7, at 57 (“[N]on-practicing entities [have]
had a much harder time post-eBay, with requests for injunctions denied up to
90 percent of the time.”).
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has been no direct infringement.119 Prior to this case, the Federal
Circuit had reasoned that because “direct infringement can exist
independently” from other forms of infringement under section
271 of the Patent Act, 120 one could be potentially liable for
inducing infringement absent a finding of direct infringement.121
In perhaps its most condescending opinion directed towards the
Federal Circuit to date, the Court overturned the appellate court’s
“fundamental[] misunderstand[ing]” of inducement, making it
more difficult to prove induced infringement.122 This, in turn,
reduces a patent troll’s likelihood of winning at an appellate level
under multiple theories of liability. 123
However, the Court’s recent patronization of the Federal
Circuit, as highlighted by Octane, Medtronic, and Limelight, may
have negative consequences that could benefit patent trolls.
Granting the district courts more discretion allows courts like the
Eastern District of Texas more room to operate in favor of patent
trolls. 124 This is exemplified through the Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. decision from early 2015, which added
more power to district courts by holding that subsidiary findings
of fact are within the sound discretion of the district court
judge. 125 Thus, when both parties put on expert witnesses to
119. 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2115 (2014).
120. Important for this analysis are the first two subsections:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes
the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable
as an infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
121. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, 692 F.3d 1301,
1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2116–17 (2014) (“Requiring
proof that there has been direct infringement as a predicate for induced
infringement is not the same as requiring proof that a single party would be
liable as a direct infringer.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271.
122. See Limelight Networks, 134 S. Ct. at 2117. See also Diane Bartz &
Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court Rulings May Make Life Harder for
Patent Trolls, REUTERS (June 2, 2014, 5:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/06/02/us-biosig-nautilus-patent-idUSKBN0ED1M320140602.
123. Bartz & Hurley, supra note 122.
124. Cf. WATKINS, supra note 2, at 23–24.
125. 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
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dispute the technical definition of the term “molecular weight,” 126
the district court judge had the discretion to pick which expert to
go with, and such decision is now reversible only if clearly
erroneous. 127 In holding so, the Court in Teva sought to align
subsidiary fact-findings within the context of claim construction
with the findings of fact under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a)(6). 128 Prior to this ruling, the Federal Circuit had reviewed
such findings of subsidiary fact de novo, 129 reasoning that “[c]laim
construction is a legal statement of the scope of the patent right,”
and the necessary subsidiary fact finding was therefore more akin
to questions of law. 130 The Supreme Court disagreed with the
Federal Circuit’s reasoning, but additionally held that the
ultimate determination of a legal question (in Teva, whether the
claim was indefinite), which has its basis in the subsidiary facts, is
still reviewable under the heightened de novo standard. 131
Regardless, by failing to endorse the view that subsidiary fact126. In Teva, the Sandoz argued that the term rendered the patent
invalid for reasons of indefiniteness, as “molecular weight” could mean (1)
“molecular weight as calculated by the weight of the molecule that is most
prevalent in the mix that makes up [the drug’s active ingredient],” (i.e. “peak
average molecular weight”), (2) “molecular weight as calculated by taking all
the different-sized molecules in the mix that makes up [the drug’s active
ingredient] and calculating the average weight” (i.e. “number average
molecular weight”) or (3) “molecular weight as calculated by taking all the
different sized molecules in the mix that makes up [the drug’s active
ingredient] and calculating their average weight while giving heavier
molecules a weight-related bonus when doing so” (i.e. “weight average
molecular weight”), all of which were commonly used in the industry. Id. at
836.
127. Id. at 835; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (stating that appellate
courts “must not set aside” the district court’s “[f]indings of fact” unless
“clearly erroneous”).
128. See Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 837–38.
129. See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am.
Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc); Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
130. Lighting Ballast, 744 F.3d at 1284.
131. Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841. But see Insite Vision Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 783
F.3d 853, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (deferring to district court’s determination of
facts underlying the ultimate legal question of nonobviousness as articulated
by expert witnesses resulted in deferring to the district court’s legal
conclusion of obviousness); Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780
F.3d 1364, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (deferring to district court’s findings of
subsidiary facts left less room for the Federal Circuit court to make its own
determination of nonobviousness).
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finding—which can define the scope of a patent’s claim—is better
discerned by knowledgeable appellate scrutiny of the record and
its associated extrinsic materials, rather than a district court
judge’s opinion, the Court inherently granted more power to
district courts like the Eastern District of Texas.132
These downstream reform efforts will not likely curb patent
abuse because they are only focused on deterring litigation. It is
still cheaper for a defendant to settle with a patent troll than to
spend money on discovery and risk a multi-million dollar
judgment.133 Keeping the patents out of trolls’ hands will further
deter litigation, which will have the added benefit of minimizing
trolls’ patent portfolios. Fortunately, we have already seen the
Court attempt to limit the access to the patent system, and while
these efforts are not necessarily directed towards patent trolls per
se, the trolls will suffer the most loss from such decisions. 134
However, more needs to be done because there is still enough
room left for trolls to change their strategy and abuse other
vulnerable areas of the patent system.
B. Patent Troll Response: Avoid Litigation, Increase Threats
While discouraging litigation is certainly a priority, a problem
associated with patent trolls does not necessarily arise from
litigation to begin with. 135 As discussed, trolls suck away at a
company’s R&D budget through litigation, but the numbers
mentioned earlier may actually be an underestimation.136 It is
inherently more economical for a defendant to settle with a
patent-troll-plaintiff than to litigate, and settlement amounts are
often subject to nondisclosure agreements, which keep them out of
the ultimate tally. 137 Lawsuits often cost millions to defend, while
“[t]he median amount spent to pay off a troll suit is just $230,000
132. Cf. Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 851 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
133. See Blanding, supra note 74 (“Patent trolls bank that, in some cases,
companies will settle rather than pay the time and monetary costs of fighting
infringement lawsuits.”).
134. See James Bessen, What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling—for
Now, ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2014/12/what-the-courts-did-to-curb-patent-trollingfor-now/
383138/ [hereinafter What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling].
135. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 76, at 3.
136. See id.
137. See New Study, supra note 78.
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for large companies and $180,000 for small- and medium-size
defendants.” 138 Furthermore, “very few strong entities in the
patent-trolling business are able to pull off giant multimilliondollar settlements,” so trolls often prefer to settle as well.139
Therefore, if troll settlements were included in the figures, the
numbers would be much higher, especially because both sides
have an incentive to settle.
Thus, an unaddressed harm comes from the extortion of
businesses, both small and large, outside of litigation. Patent
trolls are responsible for roughly 60% of patent infringement
litigation, 140 and defendants that prefer to settle still end up
losing huge sums of money: it is believed that settlements with
trolls cost large companies roughly 10% of the average R&D
budget annually,141 and costs small- to medium-sized companies
37% of their direct costs. 142 It seems that the only way to stop the
threats and the resulting settlements is to disarm the trolls of
their patents, because it is apparent that the problem arises from
the ability of patent trolls to obtain ambiguous patents in the first
place.
The Court recently attempted to reform upstream activities in
a way that may prevent trolls from getting their hands in the
honey pot. In addressing the question of indefiniteness, in 2014,
the Court unanimously held, in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., that “a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its
claims, read in light of the patent’s specification delineating the
patent and prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable
certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the
invention.” 143 While some argue that the Nautilus decision will
hurt patent trolls because, “[h]istorically speaking, the patents
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. John Chambers & Myron E. Ullman, Stopping the Economy-Sapping
Patent Trolls, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2015, 7:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/john-chambers-and-myron-ullman-stopping-the-economy-sappingpatent-trolls-1424133369.
142. See Rebecca J. Rosen, Study: Patent Trolls Cost Companies $29
Billion Last Year, ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2012/06/study-patent-trolls-cost-companies-29-billion-lastyear/259070/.
143. 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014)
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that are often asserted by patent trolls” would be weeded out by a
knowledgeable patent examiner, 144 this standard has proven
more-problematic-than-not in the patentability analysis.145
Additionally, in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 146 the
Court effectively blocked “the most egregious cases of patent
trolling” by making it more difficult for patent trolls to obtain
process patents.147 The unanimous Alice Court held that when
process patents are directed towards an abstract idea, “merely
requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” 148
For the uninitiated, products 149 and processes 150 are eligible
144. Bartz & Hurley, supra note 122 (quoting the statement of James R.
Barney, partner at Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP).
145. See infra Part III.B.
146. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
147. Klint Finley, The Patent Wars May Be Cooling, but They’re Far from
Over, WIRED (Feb. 19, 2015, 1:04 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/patentwars-may-cooling-theyre-far/.
148. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352. Reinforcing the “Mayo framework” for
determining subject matter eligibility for patents directed towards the
judicial exceptions, the Court articulated the test:
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one
of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is
there in the claims before us?” To answer that question, we consider
the elements of each claim both individually and “as an ordered
combination” to determine whether the additional elements
“transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application.
We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an
“inventive concept”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that
is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Id. at 2355 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294, 1296–
98 (2012)).
149. As typically used, a patent for a “product” means that the subject
matter of the patent is a “machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The Court has refused to read a narrow definition
into these divisions, especially when the legislature intentionally left them
broadly interpreted:
[T]his Court has read the term “manufacture” in § 101 in accordance
with its dictionary definition to mean “the production of articles for
use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new
forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor
or by machinery.” Similarly, “composition of matter” has been
construed consistent with its common usage to include “all
compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite
articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of
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for patent protection, 151 but there are three judicially created
caveats: abstract ideas, 152 natural phenomena, 153 and laws of
natures,154 are not eligible for patent protection. 155 These
exceptions are often justified on a theory of pre-emption; the
“monopolization of [abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws
of nature] through the grant of a patent might tend to impede
innovation more than it would tend to promote it.” 156
While not directly aimed towards patent trolls, the Alice
decision presents a threat to entities that typically acquire
computer-based process and business method patents that are
worded broadly enough to encompass an abstract idea.157 Alice
has helped put a dent in these specific areas by expressly
recognizing that no “inventive concept” exists in patents that
merely state an abstract idea and then “add[] the words: ‘apply it’
on a computer,” thereby invalidating patents that trolls
mechanical mixture, or whether they be gasses, fluids, powders, or
solids.”
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (citations omitted)
(omissions in original) (first quoting Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co.,
283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931); then quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp.
279, 280 (D.C. 1957)).
150. “Process,” unlike the products mentioned, is actually defined by the
Patent Act to mean a “process, art, or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”
35 U.S.C. § 100.
151. Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. §
101.
152. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358–60; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297–98
(2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010); Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978).
153. See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306
U.S. 86, 91 (1939); The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 67–69 (1887); O’Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853).
154. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013); Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
155. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352, 2354.
156. Mayo, 134 S. Ct. at 1293.
157. See Daniel Nazer, Big Patent Reform Wins in Court, Defeat (for Now)
in Congress: 2014 in Review, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 25, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/12/2014-review-big-patent-reform-winscourt-defeat-now-congress.
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notoriously hold.158 The natural consequence of the Alice decision
has been the steady denial of claims containing abstract ideas,
namely business method patents and software patents.159 This
wave of denials is important: by rejecting the patents disfavored
by Alice, trolls will not be able to purchase and abuse such patents
down the road.
Patent trolls now face a threat in the wake of Alice because if
a troll with a broad patent sues for infringement, a defendant can,
in response, bring a declaratory judgment for both
noninfringement (where it is clear that trolls would still hold the
burden of persuasion 160) and for nonvalidity (regardless of the
payment of royalty fees under a licensing deal), which could result
in a troll’s abstractly worded patent being thrown out. 161
Additionally, trolls will no longer have the “incentive to acquire
vague, overreaching patents” 162 because those patents will now
likely be invalid if challenged. In response, many trolling entities
will need to switch up their strategy. Those with ambiguously
worded patents will likely stray from litigation to avoid the threat
of invalidation under Alice, and trolls with less-broadly-worded
patents may avoid litigation in fear of the Octane attorney’s fee
holding. 163 Going forward, however, it is imperative that the
Court further disarm patent-troll-plaintiffs because the Alice
decision may not threaten many troll patents, and Octane will not
likely prevent threatening letters from travelling through the
mail.
III. CLOSING THE DOOR ON PATENT TROLLS

The Court’s June 2014 decision in Alice continues to ring as
the USPTO, the courts, and patent holders readjust to new
158. 134 S. Ct. at 2357; see also Nazer, supra note 157.
159. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, A Software Patent Setback: Alice v. CLS Bank,
IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/09/a-soft
ware-patent-setback-alice-v-cls-bank/ [hereinafter Software Patent Setback]
(“Based on this decision it is hard to see how any software patent claims
written in method form can survive challenge.”).
160. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct.
843 (2014).
161. See Finley, supra note 147.
162. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 17 (quoting James Bessen et. al, The
Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION, Winter 2011–2012, at
35, 35) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Finley, supra note 147.
163. See What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling, supra note 134.
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examination guidelines, 164 analytical frameworks, 165 and
developmental setbacks 166 respectively. Going forward, trolls
with weak patents may avoid litigation because of the invalidation
threat Alice presents, and the trolls that are not threatened by
Alice may need to shift their tactics to avoid litigation in light of
Octane’s holding. The natural consequence will not be what many
wish—that the will trolls tuck their tails between their legs and
run away—but, rather, trolls will likely find another “grey area” to
attack. Two of the three analyses involved in determining
patentability—novelty and nonobviousness—currently supply
nefarious plaintiffs with such grey areas. By using these flawed
analyses to threaten defendants behind closed doors, trolls can
avoid litigation while continuing to extort defendants into settling.
A. Encouraging Narrowly Tailored Claims
Trolls specifically obtain software and business method
patents that are broadly worded and overly vague, oftentimes
merely instructing a computer to implement a process involving
an abstract idea.167 Narrowing the area of subject matter
eligibility has helped decrease the number of potentially abusive
patents in the system168 because such patents are not permissible
under Alice.169 However, not all troll patents will be invalid
under Alice because not all troll patents will flounder if
challenged. 170
Due to this, more needs to be done to disarm the trolls.
Targeting the novelty inquiry, which is just one step downstream
from the subject matter eligibility determination (i.e., the subject
of the Alice decision), 171 would further remove ambiguous patents
164. See, e.g., 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,618, 74,633 (Dec. 16, 2014) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1); Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Commissioner
for Patent Examination Policy, to Patent Examining Corps (June 25, 2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun201
4.pdf.
165. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Software Patent Setback, supra note 159.
167. See Nazer, supra note 157.
168. See id.
169. See What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling, supra note 134.
170. See id.
171. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2012).
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from the hands of abusive litigants. Moreover, narrowing the
novelty inquiry would actually promote innovation, as it is
analogous to broadening the scope of the prior art, which is
believed to promote innovation. In order to grasp why that is, it is
important to understand how the process works in further detail.
The novelty question analyzes the prior art, or, in other
terms, “everything that an invention can be compared to when
determining whether the invention is worthy of a patent.” 172 In
analyzing the prior art, the language of the patent at issue is
important—an invention lacks novelty (i.e., it is “anticipated”) if
“a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention
[is present as] arranged . . . in the claim.” 173 Therefore, trolls with
broadly worded patents can argue that they rightfully monopolize
larger portions of the prior art, which makes it more likely that a
potentially new invention would be anticipated. 174 Trolls can also
utilize the language in their patents to argue that defendants
have infringed on their exclusive rights.175 Additionally, due to
the inherency doctrine,176 trolls and other patent holders can even
172. M. HENRY HEINES, FIRST TO FILE: PATENTS FOR TODAY’S SCIENTIST AND
ENGINEER 9 (2014); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102.
173. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (citing Soundscriber Corp. v. United States, 360 F.2d 954, 960 (Ct. Cl.
1966)); see also Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120,
2129 (2014) (“[A]bsent a meaningful definiteness check . . . patent applicants
face powerful incentives to inject ambiguity into their claims.”).
Furthermore, under the all-elements-in-a-single-reference-rule:
[U]nless a reference discloses within the four corners of the
document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the
limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the
claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing claimed
and, thus, cannot anticipate [the invention].
Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
174. See Grab, supra note 25, at 98.
175. See id. at 109.
176. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“‘To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose
every limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.’ . . .
In other words, if granting patent protection on the disputed claim would
allow the patentee to exclude the public from practicing the prior art, then
that claim is anticipated, regardless of whether it also covers subject matter
not in the prior art. . . . Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art
necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations,
it anticipates.” (citations omitted) (quoting In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473,
1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

VALENTINEFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

CURBING PATENT TROLLS

2/4/2016 8:57 PM

149

argue that their patents cover areas of the art that are not even
explicitly disclosed in their patent claims.177 In these ways, trolls
deter innovation by obtaining “weak patents [that] clog up the
system.” 178 However, by narrowing and further defining the
novelty analysis, and by foreclosing the inherency doctrine,
broadly worded patents would cover less prior art, leaving less of
the art available for trolls to claim. 179 Trolls would only obtain
patents that cover more targeted areas of the prior art, it would
also leave more areas available for patenting by good faith
innovators, thereby unclogging the prior art and incentivizing
innovation. A comparison might be needed, and, luckily, a recent
statutory enactment has shown to be analogous.
As postulated, the ultimate result of narrowly interpreting
claims in the novelty inquiry would be to increase innovation.
Incentivizing innovation was the same goal of the America Invents
Act (“AIA”), 180 which was enacted by Congress in 2011.181 The
AIA sought to accomplish this goal by broadening the scope of the
prior art in the novelty analysis.182 By introducing the “first-tofile rule, which imposes its greatest differences on the ‘prior’ of
‘prior art,’” the AIA resulted in “more art being ‘prior’ under the
177.
See id.
178. ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 37 (2012); see also
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (“[A]
patent must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is claimed,
thereby ‘appris[ing] the public of what is still open to them.’ Otherwise there
would be ‘[a] zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may
enter only at the risk of infringement claims.’” (second and third alterations
in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996); then quoting United
Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)).
179. See Grab, supra note 25, at 108.
180. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
181. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011); see also HEINES, supra
note 172, at 24.
182. See HEINES, supra note 172, at 11. However, the AIA does not have
a retroactive effect, therefore, the relevant prior art will vary based on the
date of the patent application—while applications filed on March 16, 2013
and beyond are subject to “prior art defined by the first-to-file rule” (i.e. preAIA prior art standards), those applications filed before March 16, 2013 will
be compared to the prior art as “defined by the first-to-invent rule” as set out
in the AIA. Id. at 10. To compound the differential treatments further,
“[c]ertain applications filed after March 16, 2013 will still be subject to the
first-to-invent rule . . . and some [applications] will be subject to both.” Id.
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AIA than pre-AIA.” 183 The AIA accomplished this by increasing
the total number of (1) United States patents and published
patent applications, (2) published literature, (3) commercial
activities, and (4) disclosures that are “otherwise available to the
public” that an applicant’s patent is compared to in the novelty
determination. 184
As a result, fewer inventions are now
considered novel under the AIA because the pool of the prior art
was widened.185
Congress has determined that broadening the pool of the prior
art, thereby making it more difficult for an invention to be
considered novel, would incentivize innovation. 186 This is evident
in examining the legislative intent behind the AIA; it is clear that
the law “remains true to [its] constitutional command,” of
“promot[ing] innovation by granting inventors temporally limited
monopolies on their inventions in a manner that ultimately
benefits the public through the disclosure of the invention to the
public.” 187 Therefore, because the AIA makes it more difficult for
inventions to be novel by implementing a broader prior art with
the ultimate purpose of incentivizing innovation, implementing
other methods that would make it more difficult for inventions to
be considered novel may also reinforce the purpose of incentivizing
innovation. One way to do this is by strengthening the novelty
inquiry through the judiciary. 188
183. Id. at 11. Responsively, the nonobviousness requirement only
changed in an incremental fashion to reflect the broadened scope of the prior
art. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be
obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically
disclosed as set forth in section 102 [(the novelty requirement)], if the
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which the claimed invention pertains.”).
184. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
185. See HEINES, supra note 172, at 11.
186. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1 (2011).
187. Id. at 38, 40.
188. Tangentially, it is not even clear whether some pre-AIA holdings are
still applicable after the AIA. Compare Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon
Bearing & Auto Parts, 153 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding that an
inventor’s secret commercial exploitation of an invention prior to its
patenting is considered a “public use” under the pre-AIA scope of the prior
art), and W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1549 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (“The nonsecret use of a claimed process in the usual course of
producing articles for commercial purposes is a public use [under the pre-AIA
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The current judicial novelty inquiry is similar to the common
law “four-corners rule” in contracts. The “all elements in a single
document rule” requires that a single prior art reference disclose
all enabling elements, 189 either explicitly or inherently, of another
invention in order for a latter patent to be anticipated.190
Furthermore, the invention’s “claimed arrangement or
combination of those elements must also be disclosed, either
expressly or inherently, in that same prior art reference.” 191
Narrowly tailoring claims to certain arrangements,
combinations, and ranges has been shown to leave little room for a
finding of anticipation. 192 Such tailoring not only enhances the
scope of the prior art].”), with Examination Guidelines for Implementing the
First-Inventor-to-File Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 11,059, 11,062 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1)
(arguing that the statutory edition of “or otherwise available to the public” to
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) indicates that secret commercial exploitation of an
invention prior to patenting does not render the invention as part of the prior
art and is therefore is not barred from patentability due to lack of novelty),
and In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (standing for the
proposition that in order for a disclosure to be publically accessible, the
inquiry is “whether it could be located by ‘persons interested and ordinarily
skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence.’” (quoting
Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2008)).
189. The single prior art reference must “enable one of skill in the field of
the invention to make and use the claimed invention.” Merck & Co. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
190. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325,
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010); MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Celeritas Techs. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
191. Therasense, 593 F.3d at 1333; see also In re Cruciferous Sprout Lit.,
301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“In order to prove that a claim is
anticipated . . . defendants must present clear and convincing evidence that a
single prior art reference discloses, either expressly or inherently, each
limitation of the claim.”); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542,
1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983). However, the language of the claim does not
necessarily have to be identical to the prior art reference for it to be
anticipated. See, e.g., In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“‘For a
prior art reference to anticipate in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 102, every element of
the claimed invention must be identically shown in a single reference.’ These
elements must be arranged as in the claim under review, but this is not an
‘ipsissimis verbis’ test.”) (first quoting Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps,
Inc., 850 F.2d 675, 677 (Fed. Cir. 1988); then quoting Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 & n.11 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
192. See HEINES, supra note 172, at 84–86; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (“The limits of a patent
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likeliness of novelty in the patent examination, but also reduces
the chance it will be overturned when challenged in court. It will
also prevent the clogging of the prior art because patents would
cover a less broad area of the prior art. 193 Therefore, narrowly
tailoring claims would leave more areas, albeit narrow as well, of
the prior art for good faith innovators to patent, and incentivize
innovation in such areas. Moreover, patent trolls would have to
put more effort into finding multiple patents if they wish to
monopolize an entire area of the prior art in the future.
However, the allowance of inherent disclosures subverts the
current “all elements in a single document” rule because it allows
for elements not within the document to act as if they were
increasing the scope of a patent 194 to areas not even disclosed to
the public. 195 To fix this broadening feature, inherent disclosures
should be eliminated. Allowing inherent disclosures facilitates
broadly scoped claims, which undermines innovation and
discourages competition. 196 By allowing a patent to cover areas of
the art not explicitly stated in a patent, the public cannot possibly
know what areas of the art another inventor lawfully
monopolizes. 197 Discouraging ambiguous patent claims by
nullifying inherent disclosures would ultimately leave these
undisclosed areas of the prior art open for the prudent inventor,
rather than a potential patent troll, to grab onto, with the end
result of increased innovation.
To return back to the AIA analogy, incentivizing innovation
must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the
inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent
will be dedicated ultimately to the public.”).
193. Cf. FELDMAN, supra note 178, at 37.
194. See, e.g., Bettcher Indus. Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 654
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc. 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2003); MEHL/Biophile, 192 F.3d at 1365. But see Trintec Indus., Inc. v.
Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Inherency does not
embrace probabilities or possibilities.”).
195. Cf. HEINES, supra note 172, at 73.
196. Cf. FELDMAN, supra note 178, at 37; HEINES, supra note 172, at 73.
197. Cf. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128
(2014) (“Patent claims . . . should be construed from an objective perspective
of a [skilled artisan], based on what the applicant actually claimed, disclosed,
and stated during the application process.” (quoting Joshua D. Sarnoff &
Edward D. Manzo, An Introduction to, Premises of, and Problems with Patent
Claim Construction, in PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
9 (Edward D. Manzo ed., 2014)).
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was not its only purpose—“[t]he legislation [was also] designed to
establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that
[would] improve patent quality and limit unnecessary
counterproductive litigation costs.” 198 Congress believes that
higher quality patents ensure that “the United States . . .
maintain[s] its competitive edge in a global economy,” and
encourages narrowly tailored claims to meet such goal by effecting
a broader prior art, the effects of which are just starting to
materialize. 199
Narrowing the scope of patent claims by
eliminating areas that facilitate broader claims, such as inherent
disclosures, would therefore be an effective way to increase overall
patent quality and encourage competition. 200
Increased
competition would incentivize innovation, and higher patent
quality would also have the added benefit of increasing efficiency
at the USPTO.201
B. The Nonobviousness Definition is Not Obvious
Another area of patent law that needs guidance is
nonobviousness.202 The area of nonobviousness has plagued the
patent community due to its inconsistent application and
indeterminate standard. 203 Adding further insult to injury, juries
inevitably end up siding with hindsight, 204 making “obviousness”
an inevitable patent killer. Once obviousness is found, it is nearly
impossible to convince someone otherwise. 205 It has already been
198. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011).
199. Id.; see also Pomper, supra note 31.
200. Cf. Atofina v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (“There may be many species encompassed within a genus that are
not disclosed by a mere disclosure of the genus. On the other hand, a very
small genus can be a disclosure of each species within the genus.”); In re
Meyer, 599 F.2d 1026, 1031–32 (Fed. Cir. 1979) (holding that a claim of a
genus does not mean that the patent claims all species within the genus).
201. See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2014–2018
STRATEGIC PLAN (2014) [hereinafter USPTO STRATEGIC PLAN], http://www.
uspto.gov/about/stratplan/USPTO_2014-2018_Strategic_Plan.pdf.
202. See Gregory N. Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity: The Supreme
Court’s Failure to Define Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR
v. Teleflex, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323 (2008) [hereinafter Another Missed
Opportunity].
203. See id at 324.
204. See id. at 340.
205. See id. at 336–37.

VALENTINEFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/4/2016 8:57 PM

154 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:118
argued that Alice may lead to some trolls avoiding litigation. 206
Further, having a more selective novelty analysis will help unclog
the system, which will lead to increased innovation and increased
competition, and may result in less art belonging to trolls.207 In
addition, with Octane increasing the stakes, others will avoid
litigation to avoid possible attorney’s fees. 208 However, some
trolls may not fear these reforms—they will not fear invalidation
under Alice because their patents are strong enough to meet the
threshold, and they will not fear Octane because a multi-million
dollar verdict can offset any possible attorney’s fees awarded.
Moreover, some trolls would not fear a more selective novelty
inquiry because their patents have already been determined as
novel. Furthermore, none of the Court’s recent decisions really
threaten the trolls’ ability to send letters that extort defendants
into settlements. Those who fear litigation may come to realize
that they can take advantage of the hindsight bias and the
meaningless nonobviousness standard.
Plaintiff-trolls can
challenge the validity of their prey’s patent by oversimplifying
issues to a jury (as they already do 209) and use that threat to
strong-arm defendants into settling outside of court. Thus, it is of
the highest priority that the Court steps in to give some shape to
the flawed nonobviousness standard.
It is easy to see, just by looking at the statute, how jurors
have a difficult time understanding nonobviousness. 210 Section
103 of the Patent Act states that an invention is obvious “if the
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are
such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been
obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
the invention pertains.”211 However, the jury is asked for a
determination of nonobviousness. Stated another way, in order
for an invention to be not obvious, jurors must find that a person
206. See supra Part II.B.
207. See supra Part III.A.
208. See supra Part II.B.
209. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 30. But see In re Robertson, 169 F.3d
743, 745 (Fed. Cir 1999) (“Inherency, however, may not be established by
probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result
from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” (quoting Cont’l Can Co. v.
Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264,1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
210. See Another Missed Opportunity, supra note 202, at 335–36.
211. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
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of ordinary skill in the art would not have thought the invention
was obvious at the time it was made.212 The double negative is
only further confused if a jury is instructed that patent ineligible
inventions are invalid, not-novel inventions are invalid, but notobvious inventions are not invalid. 213 Additionally, the statute
also states that “[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.” 214 However, the
statutory language is only the tip of the nonobvious problem, but
some additional background information may be needed to explain
why.
In comparing novelty and nonobviousness, nonobviousness
raises questions of quality rather than quantity.215 Both analyses
target the prior art, but nonobviousness posits a different
question: Would a person having ordinary skill in the field think
that the particular invention is obvious, when compared to the
prior art, either because it is an instinctive or miniscule departure
from previous inventions, or due to the obviousness of combining
prior art references? 216 This inquiry “is thus determined by an
evaluation of the invention itself, including its properties,
operability, and utility, not by how much brainstorming, testing,
or searching the inventor had to go through to arrive at the
invention.” 217 Recently, the Court broadened the nonobviousness
inquiry in KSR v. Teleflex 218 when two or more prior art elements
are combined, the result of which some commentators have
described as the Supreme Court’s supreme failure. 219 Most novel
212. See id.; see also Another Missed Opportunity, supra note 202, at 326.
213. See Another Missed Opportunity, supra note 202, at 325.
214. Id.; see also Richard S. Gruner, Everything Old is New Again:
Obviousness Limitations on Patenting Computer Updates of Old Designs, 9
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 209, 264 (2003); Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands:
Who’s Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 848 (2002).
215. See HEINES, supra note 172, at 87, 89.
216. See 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 406 (2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
217. See HEINES, supra note 172, at 89.
218. 550 U.S. 398.
219. See Another Missed Opportunity, supra note 202, at 324; see also
Jason Brewer, Updating the Patent System’s Novelty Requirement to Promote
Small-Molecule Medicinal Progress, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1151, 1169
(2012); Gene Quinn, KSR on the 5th Anniversary: One Supremely Obvious
Mess, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/04/29/
ksr-the-5th-anniversary-one-supremely-obvious-mess/.
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inventions will face the KSR v. Teleflex standard, as just about
everything in the present day is a combination of prior art
elements on some metaphysical level.220
Currently, the standard for examining nonobviousness
requires courts to consider the factors laid out in Graham v. John
Deere Co., which include: (1) the scope and content of the relevant
prior art; (2) the differences between the disclosed invention and
the prior art; and (3) the “level of ordinary skill” involved in the
industry. 221
Additionally, the courts may also consider
oftentimes-irrelevant “secondary factors” such as the invention’s
“commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of
others, etc., . . . to give light to the circumstances surrounding the
origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.” 222 This
analysis is further compounded in light of the Supreme Court’s
holding in KSR, which stated that a combination of prior art
references may be obvious if a person having ordinary skill in the
art may have hypothetically tried it. 223
In KSR, the Court rejected a rigid application of the
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test 224 previously utilized by
the Federal Circuit to determine whether a combination of prior
art elements was obvious, and instead posed the obviousness
inquiry in light of the Graham factors: whether the prior art
disclosures “would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new
invention does.” 225 However, the Court never attempted to
indicate whom a person of “ordinary skill in the art” would be and
did not direct courts to analyze any specific area of the art.
Instead, the Court merely claimed that a person of ordinary skill
in the art is “also a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton.” 226 This standard has been inconsistently applied by
220. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19.
221. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
222. Id.; see also HEINES, supra note 172, at 107.
223. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420.
224. Under this test, the combination of prior art elements “is only proved
obvious if ‘some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings’
can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a
person having ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 407 (quoting Al-Site Corp. v.
VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
225. Id. at 418.
226. Id. at 421.
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the USPTO, 227 and has led towards more deference to
nonobjective hindsight in the courts.228 Moreover, since the KSR
holding, there has been a steady increase in the total number of
patents issued and maintained: while just over 150,000 patents
were issued in 2008, the amount more than doubled to just shy of
304,000 in 2014.229
The collective ambiguity is a result of the undefined “person of
ordinary skill in the art” standard. To illustrate, if an inventor
creates a method for administering a topical agent to treat
bacterial ear infections, is the person of ordinary skill in the prior
art the doctor who administers the antibacterial agent or a
researcher with extensive knowledge of creating pharmaceuticals
to treat such bacterial ear infections? The Federal Circuit, in
Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., overturned a district court
ruling of nonobviousness for this invention that hinged on the
belief that the person of ordinary skill was that of a person with a
medical degree; the Federal Circuit, on the other hand, based its
ruling of obviousness on the belief that inventors in the art
comprised only “specialists in drug and ear treatments.” 230
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reasoned that an ordinary
pediatrician would neither have the means nor motivation to
create the “compound to treat ear infections without damaging a

227. See Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the
Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 109 (2008) [hereinafter The Non-Obvious Problem];
see also ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, 32–35, 75, 119–23, 145–49 (2004); A
PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 87–95; Carl Shapiro, Patent System
Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1018
(2004).
228. See Another Missed Opportunity, supra note 202, at 340–42.
229. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2014
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 146 tbl. 6 (2014), http://
www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf. While some may
attribute this to the increasing demand for patents worldwide, the amount of
patents the USPTO has issued to residents of foreign countries has not
increased significantly in the past five years, the only notable exception being
Japan. Id. at 151–52 tbl. 10; see also USPTO STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note
201, at 5.
230. 501 F.3d 1254, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’g 441 F. Supp. 2d 672
(D. N.J. 2006).
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patient’s hearing,” and ruled the invention obvious. 231 Thus, it is
apparent that nonobviousness will differ depending on whether
the person of ordinary skill in the art is one that could conceive
the invention versus one who could reduce the invention to
practice in order to fix a problem.232
The nonobviousness analysis is further complicated based on
which field of art a court chooses to analyze. Presumably, the
ordinary level of skill required for people in sophisticated arts is
high, while the level of ordinary skill required for those in less
sophisticated fields is low. 233 If the art is very complicated, it
could even be impossible for an inventor in a sophisticated field to
meet the threshold because jurors cannot easily place themselves
in such an inventor’s shoes. 234 The same result can occur in areas
where the art does not require a high level of skill because it is
easier to “implement a predictable variation” of a previous
invention within the relevant prior art through “a simple
mechanical solution.” 235 Simply stated, the ultimate result is that
“[t]oo high a nonobviousness standard reduces the incentives for
innovators to invent and disclose,” while “[t]oo low a
nonobviousness standard allows excessive patenting.” 236
In attempting to answer the question of ordinary skill in the
art, courts oftentimes consider many factors,237 several of which
are oftentimes unhelpful. For example, two factors frequently
considered are: (1) the inventor’s education level, and (2) the level
of sophistication required in the art.238 Highly sophisticated and
educated artists are expected to possess a higher level of
creativity, and, therefore, the bar is set artificially high. 239 On
231. Id. at 1257.
232. See The Non-Obvious Problem, supra note 227, at 72–76.
233. See id. at 75–76.
234. See id. at 76.
235. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007); Izzo Golf, Inc.
v. King Par Golf Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 334, 340 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
236. The Non-Obvious Problem, supra note 227, at 89.
237. See, e.g., Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Factors that may be considered in determining level of
ordinary skill in the art include: (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2)
type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those
problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of
the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.”).
238. See id.
239. See The Non-Obvious Problem, supra note 227, at 74–76.

VALENTINEFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

CURBING PATENT TROLLS

2/4/2016 8:57 PM

159

the other side of the spectrum, the bar is set artificially low; even
educated artists in a relatively unsophisticated field can have a
difficult time convincing a lay jury that their invention was not
obvious because their art is not sophisticated.240 The result is the
same in both situations—an obviousness finding. In one situation,
jurors will assume a highly intelligent person would have thought
the invention was obvious because the heightened level of skill
required in the art requires an inventor to frequently think of
solutions; in the other, the low sophistication of the art almost
presumes obviousness. 241
Thus, diligent patent trolls that
recognize this quandary can put the level of ordinary skill in the
art into controversy to either conflate or simplify the issues.242
This is particularly dangerous in the realm of patent trolling,
where infringement plaintiffs often oversimplify legal issues and
tug on the heartstrings of jurors in eastern Texas. 243
Adding fuel to the fire is the existence of hindsight bias. The
nonobviousness inquiry ponders whether the invention would
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the
time it was invented, but “when a patent application or a patent
comes to an examiner or a court, an invention has [already] been
achieved and a problem has been solved.” 244 Although “a lay
decision maker can place himself or herself in the mindset of an
ordinary person . . . lay individuals are generally not cognitively
capable” of putting themselves in the shoes of an artist with
ordinary skill at whatever time the invention was made. 245
Sometimes even multiple generations of the invention at issue
have developed since the patent in question was issued and trolls
240. See id. at 75.
241. See id. at 74–76.
242. Cf. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citing Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2003)) (stating that when the level of ordinary skill in the art is not in
controversy, the courts will not address the inquiry of ordinary skill). But see
Printguard, Inc. v. Anti-Mktg. Sys., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 189, 203 (D. Mass.
2008) (“[I]t is well-established that in certain situations, such as with
relatively simple and understandable technology, a specific finding on the
level of ordinary skill in the art is unnecessary because the prior art itself is
representative of the relevant level of ordinary skill.”).
243. See WATKINS, supra note 2, at 30–31.
244. Jun Wu, Note, Rewinding Time: Advances in Mitigating Hindsight
Bias in Patent Obviousness Analysis, 97 KY. L.J. 565, 570 (2009).
245. The Non-Obvious Problem, supra note 227, at 94.
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that own older patents for obsolete technologies can argue that
such advancements infringe on their technologically ancient
patent. 246 Alternatively, the same troll-plaintiffs could bring a
declaratory judgment in order to invalidate their target’s patent
based on obviousness. This is likely, considering that some
downstream barriers set up by the Court to curb patent trolling
may be ineffective.
These advances are believed to deter
litigation, which makes the threat of invalidation a more valuable
weapon for a troll because invalidation can be achieved via several
methods of internal review. Therefore, it is imperative that the
nonobviousness standard gets is thoroughly and clearly defined 247
before further abuse manifests itself in this gaping hole.
CONCLUSION

Patent trolls threaten the economy and undermine the
246. See, e.g., 2014 in Patent Litigation, supra note 63, at fig. 21.
247. The author currently abstains from providing any suggestion as to
what this definition might be because scholars with far more experience and
knowledge in the field have supplied plenty of alternatives. For example,
some argue that the test for obviousness should be dependent upon the
motives for the invention—would the inventor have combined prior art
elements “but for” the incentives of the patent system? See TO PROMOTE
INNOVATION, supra note 94, ch. 4, at 6–8; Robert Merges, Uncertainty and the
Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 35 (1992). Others argue for a
test that bases obviousness on whether the invention was more than a mere
trivial advance from the prior art. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success
and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV.
803, 812 (1988). Another alternative is the constitutional standard, which
seeks to set the nonobviousness standard at a level that would most
efficiently promote innovation. See, e.g., Malla Pollack, The Multiple
Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common Sense,
Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 120 (2002). However, all of these standards have
fundamental flaws that would result in the same murky uncertainties. See
The Non-Obvious Problem, supra note 227, at 84–89. Arguably the most
favorable standard would “depend on how probable the invention would have
been for a person having ordinary skill in the art working on the problem
that the invention solves.” Id. at 116. This is supported by case law and “at
worst . . . provides no less incentive [to innovate] than the current standard.”
Id. at 118; see also DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567
F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Although predictability is a touchstone of
obviousness, the ‘predictable result’ discussed in KSR refers not only to the
expectation that prior art elements are capable of being physically combined,
but also that the combination would have worked for its intended purpose.”
(quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007))).
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Constitution by impeding innovation in open court and behind
closed doors. Although the Supreme Court has taken steps in
addressing the troll problem, these will only be temporary fixes.
While some of the decisions of the past decade will deter trolls
from litigation because of the threat of invalidation, increased or
shifted burdens, or attorney’s fees, the strong will still survive and
continue with their nefarious tactics. In addressing the patent
troll epidemic, it is imperative to not merely set up barriers
downstream focusing on litigation. A much more effective method
is to target ambiguous areas before the issue reaches the courts.
To put a large dent in abusive patent troll activities both inside
and outside of court, the system must change in a manner that
keeps patents out of abusive litigants’ hands to begin with. If
patent trolls manage to hold broadly scoped patents, the strongest
remedy would be to increase the scrutiny involved in the
patentability analysis to make the system more impervious to troll
tactics. Trolls will continue to send out threatening letters, and
until their firepower is reduced, they will continue to remain a
threat. Such lasting change must come from the Court because
other modes have been astoundingly ineffective.

